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THE COURT’S GERRYMANDERING CONUNDRUM: HOW HYPERPARTISANSHIP IN POLITICS ALTERS THE RUCHO DECISION
Vince Mancini*
Abstract
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rucho v. Common Cause
was the latest in a line of opinions regarding reviewability of
gerrymandering claims related to the constitutionally required decennial
state redistricting process. In Rucho, the Court altered the course of future
electoral processes and held that partisan gerrymandering claims were
nonjusticiable. In doing so, the Court failed to consider obvious pitfalls in
limiting the type of review available for these gerrymandering claims. In
particular, the Court failed to understand the gravity of the impact such a
decision would have on minority voting power and discarded one of the
few structural safeguards our democratic process has in place to ensure
fair elections. Chained to the idea that review of the redistricting cycle
should remain with the state, the Court overestimated the power of state
courts and the democratic process to mitigate partisan bias in the
redistricting process. If left unchecked, these state legislatures, fueled by
the hyper-partisan politics of our day, could erode all faith in the electoral
process and dilute votes to the point of giving them little value to the
electoral process, depending on the party of the candidate.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1812, then-Governor of Massachusetts, Elbridge Gerry, signed a
redistricting proposal that would allow his party, the Democratic-Republicans, to
retain control of the state senate with little competition from the opposing Federalist
Party.1 The local news outlets mocked the partisan apportionment plan and took
particular offense to the affected district in Gerry’s home county of Essex, whose
contorted boundaries resembled the shape of a salamander.2 The journalists, needing
a name to describe what they found to be a blatantly undemocratic process,
combined the name of “Gerry” with the animal shape similar to that of his home
district, and in turn, the term “gerrymander” was born.3
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1
See Anna Khomina, Elbridge Gerry and the Original Gerrymander, GILDER
LEHRMAN INST. OF AM. HIST. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.gilderlehrman.org/news/elbridgegerry-and-original-gerrymander [https://perma.cc/FNC3-FYF9].
2
Id.
3
Id.
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Since then, gerrymandering has been a consistent practice in state districting
apportionment plans.4 The rise of hyper-partisan politics, however, presents
unchartered territory for the U.S. Supreme Court (“Court”) in its decisions on
whether to interfere in this process. In recent years, the Court, while acknowledging
the justiciability5 of racial gerrymandering, has refused to acknowledge the
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering.
This Note gives an overview of the state redistricting process as well as a
history of how redistricting cases have historically been decided by the Court. Part
II discusses the process of redistricting generally and outlines the different principles
states are supposed to use to draw their district lines. Part III reviews the history of
the Court’s decisions regarding racial and partisan gerrymandering claims up until
the most recent Rucho v. Common Cause decision. Part IV first argues that the
hyper-partisan nature of today’s political climate requires the Court to reconsider its
justiciability stance as it relates to partisan gerrymandering, and second, argues that
federal courts, not state courts, are the body best suited to make the determination
of whether an improper gerrymander occurred during the redistricting process.
Finally, Part V recommends a test the Court can apply to future partisan
gerrymandering judicial determinations should the Court reverse its decision on the
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims.
II. STATE CONSIDERATIONS IN THE REDISTRICTING PROCESS
Redistricting gets its authority from the U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 2,
clause 3, which requires that every ten years representatives be apportioned by their
representative states.6 The Court generally affords states discretion to draw their
districts but has stated some traditional “principles” on which states should rely for
a showing of an unbiased map-drawing process; these include “compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions.”7 While a minor digression from
these principles does not wholly indicate an unconstitutional gerrymander, a drastic
deviation can support a showing that a state sought to reapportion districts in a
particular way so as to suppress the vote of a particular representative group in the

4
See ERIK J. ENGSTROM, PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1–18 (2013).
5
In this Note, “justiciability” refers to the authorization from Article III, section 2 of
the Constitution for federal courts to hear several types of “cases” and “controversies.” See
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Court has interpreted these words as giving rise to a series
of limits on judicial power and determined that federal courts can only hear cases that fall
under the scope of a valid case or controversy. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
For the purpose of this Note, “nonjusticiability” refers to the inappropriateness of a particular
subject for judicial consideration. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
6
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union,” and “[t]he actual Enumeration shall
be made . . . within every subsequent Term of ten Years . . . .”).
7
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
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state.8 This Part examines the primary traditional principles—(A) population, (B)
contiguity, (C) compactness, (D) traditional boundaries, and (E) communities of
interest—courts look towards to determine whether there was bias in the
redistricting process.
A. Population Deviation
One principle for an unbiased approach to redistricting is to minimize
population deviation between districts.9 The basis of this minimal variance standard
comes from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
declares that states shall not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”10 The Court has consistently held, starting with Baker v.
Carr, that the Equal Protection Clause prevents states from creating districts with
disproportionate populations.11
In Baker, the Court gave its first instruction to its population variance standard
and took its first significant stance on gerrymandered districts.12 The issue
considered in the case was whether Tennessee’s redistricting plan, which had not
realigned the state’s districts in over 60 years and had heavily skewed population
proportions from district to district, ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.13
Further, the Court had to determine whether this issue, which is based on a political
right, was a nonjusticiable political question. Under the political question doctrine,
courts should not decide overtly political cases out of respect for separation of
powers between the three branches of government.14 In Carr, the Court established
two main criteria for determining whether an issue violates the political question
doctrine: “[1] the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing
finality to the action of the political departments and . . . [2] the lack of satisfactory
criteria for a judicial determination.”15 Ultimately, the Court found there was federal
jurisdiction and no conflict with the political question doctrine16 for the Court to

8
See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755 (1983) (noting that “dramatically
irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation.”).
9
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 191 (noting that polarized population deviation could signal
an unconstitutional redistricting process).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 197–98.
12
See id. at 208–09.
13
See id. at 188–89.
14
See id. at 210.
15
See id. (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939)); see also id. at 217
(laying out six independent tests for the existence of a political question).
16
See id. at 209 (“Of course the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political
right does not mean it presents a political question.”).
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consider constitutional challenges to state legislative redistricting plans when
brought under the Equal Protection Clause.17
Two years later, in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court expounded on Baker and held
that the Equal Protection Clause, as it relates to gerrymandering, requires that the
vote of any citizen be “approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen of
the state.”18
While this “one-person, one-vote” rule still holds, the Court has consistently
rejected any exact quantifiable standard for permissible variance in a redistricting
population deviation.19 For example, in 2012, the Court found that a legislative
redistricting reapportionment plan, which had a variance of 0.79 percent, did not run
afoul of the “one-person, one-vote” rule.20 Therefore, as it stands today, for a state
to survive review on the population deviation redistricting principle, it must make a
good-faith effort to make population variance as minimal as is reasonable, but some
variance will be allowed.21
B. Contiguity
A second “traditional” principle that states should rely on for redistricting is the
relatively straightforward concept that districts must be contiguous.22 The
contiguous district standard requires that “all parts of the district must be connected
in some way with the rest of the district.”23 For example, a state cannot create a
district that consists of a county in the northwest part of the state and an unconnected
county in the southeast part of the state.24 Because of its simplicity, courts have not
interpreted the cohesiveness of a redistricted district’s contiguity other than to refer
to it as a traditional redistricting principle.25

17

See id. at 237 (“[T]he complaint’s allegations of a denial of equal protection present
a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial and a
decision. The right asserted is within the reach of judicial protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
18
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
19
See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 725–26 (1983) (“There are no de minimis
population variations, which could practicably be avoided, that may be considered as
meeting the standard of Art. I, § 2, without justification.”).
20
Tennant v. Jefferson County, 567 U.S. 758, 764 (2012).
21
See id.
22
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
23
Redistricting Criteria, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org
/research/redistricting/redistricting-criteria.aspx [https://perma.cc/6XWH-X54B] (last
visited June 12, 2022).
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
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C. Compactness
A third principle that states should apply to their redistricting criteria is that the
districts must be “compact.”26 In general, compactness refers “to both how close a
legislative district’s boundaries are to its geographic center and how ‘regular’ in
shape a district appears to be.”27 The concept of compactness may be a traditional
principle, but there is little consensus as to what standard is used to determine
whether an apportioned district is sufficiently “compact.”28 The Court has not been
helpful in establishing a uniform standard of qualitative analysis; however, it has
recognized that “dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force
to call for an explanation.”29 While the Court may not find a redistricting
apportionment plan to be unconstitutional based on compactness alone, it may use a
finding of irregular compactness among a particular district as a sign that the
redistricting process was gerrymandered by the state.30 Because a lack of
compactness can lead to increased scrutiny by the court, 37 states have compactness
requirements for the drawing of their state legislative districts, and 18 states have
compactness requirements for the drawing of their congressional districts.31
D. Maintaining Traditional Boundaries
Further, states should follow traditional boundaries when considering new
districts. In Bush v. Vera, the Court held that a district that takes “into account
traditional districting principles such as maintaining traditional boundaries” may
survive a claim alleging an unlawful gerrymander.32 In this sense, maintaining
traditional boundaries “refers to not crossing county, city, or town boundaries when
drawing districts.”33 This criteria “provides an important reference point for courts
undertaking the predominance analysis,”34 which is an analysis used by courts in
26

Id. at 647.
Aaron R. Kaufman, Gary King & Mayya Komisarchik, How to Measure Legislative
District Compactness If You Only Know It When You See It, 65 AM. J. POL. SCI. 533, 533
(2021), https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/ajps.12603.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5E9YVRH].
28
See id. at 534 (“Although many state constitutions explicitly require compactness,
the vast majority provide no definition or measure for how to detect violations of the
standard.”).
29
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30
See id. (“One need not use Justice Stewart’s classic definition of obscenity—‘I know
it when I see it’—as an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a gerrymander
to recognize that dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for
an explanation.”).
31
Compactness, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Compactness [https://perma.cc/
Y36K-F6C6] (last visited June 12, 2022).
32
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996).
33
Redistricting Criteria, supra note 23.
34
Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 538 (E.D. Va. 2015).
27
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racial gerrymandering cases and will be discussed further below.35 The difficulty
with this principle is that some states have many districts, and it is impossible for
them to comply with the population deviation requirement without dividing certain
towns, cities, or counties.36
E. Maintaining Communities of Interest
Finally, states should maintain communities of interest while redrawing
districts. Maintaining communities of interest is a similar requirement to
maintaining traditional boundaries. Instead of preserving town, city, or county lines,
however, this principle maintains areas where “the residents have common political
interests”37 and prevents the legislature from diluting this political power. This
principle is perhaps the vaguest of all the traditional principles in that defining
common political interests is an extremely difficult standard for courts to scrutinize
uniformly. Adherence to this principle rests on the same rationale as that of
maintaining traditional boundaries. Specifically, the Court may infer a gerrymander
if a state legislature targeted a particular community of interest—for example, a
community that contains a predominant ethnic majority—and split that majority into
separate districts for the purpose of diluting their voting power.38
These traditional principles serve as a basis for many state redistricting
considerations. If states fail to follow these principles, they may face judicial review
of their redistricting process. Part III discusses how the Court conducts this review.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE COURT’S GERRYMANDERING ANALYSIS
Part II laid out traditional redistricting principles that courts refer to in their
gerrymandering analysis. Save for the population deviation requirement, however,
these principles serve more as guideposts that can help states create a non-biased
redistricting apportionment.39 Article I, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution gives
states the authority to adopt these practices, but they are under no constitutional

35

See supra Part III.A.
For example, California, the state with the most congressional districts, has 53
congressional districts which must comply with the population deviation requirement. See
Directory of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://www.house.gov/rep
resentatives#state_ca [https://perma.cc/YGG9-KEFN] (last visited June 12, 2022).
37
Redistricting Criteria, supra note 23.
38
See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 937–38 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If
race rather than incumbency protection had been the dominant consideration, it seems highly
unlikely that the Democrats would have drawn this bizarre district rather than accepting more
compact options that were clearly available . . . . Instead, as the detailed findings of the
District Court demonstrate, the legislature deliberately crafted a districting plan that would
accommodate the needs of Democratic incumbents.”).
39
See supra Part II.
36
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requirement to do so.40 While there is no constitutional requirement, a state that
substantially deviates from these principles can signal to courts it conducted a
gerrymander. Depending on the severity of the gerrymander, courts may find the
redistricting unconstitutional.41 When evaluating the constitutionality of a
gerrymander, the Court views racial and partisan gerrymandering differently. This
Part explores the Court’s distinction between racial and partisan gerrymandering and
will explain why this distinction is determinative of whether the Court will find the
gerrymander to be federally justiciable.42
A. Racial Gerrymandering
Subsection 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) of 1965 prohibits all states
from imposing any voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting standards,
practices, or procedures “in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”43
Subsection 2(a), along with the Equal Protection Clause, creates a cause of action
for cases in which racial gerrymandering is alleged.
1. Judicial Standard for Racial Gerrymandering Claims
Beginning in 1986, with its opinion in Thornburg v. Gingles,44 the Court
established a test for an unlawful racial gerrymander under subsection 2(a) of the
VRA.45 In Thornburg, the Court held that, as a precondition to any finding of a
violation under subsection 2(a), a discriminated party must first show that a
majority-minority district is viable and likely to occur through a redistricting
reapportionment.46 While the Court did not define a majority-minority district, it can
best be described as one in which a “racial minority equals 50 percent or more of the
citizen voting-age population.”47

40

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this Union,” and “[t]he actual Enumeration
shall be made . . . within every subsequent Term of ten Years . . . .”).
41
See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 141 (1986) (“[E]vidence of exclusive
legislative process and deliberate drawing of district lines in accordance with accepted
gerrymandering principles would be relevant to intent . . . .”).
42
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (defining justiciability as “the
inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial consideration”).
43
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 117–130, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)).
44
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
45
See id.
46
Id. at 50.
47
Majority-Minority District, REDISTRICTING: KEY TERMS, https://redistricting.lls.edu/
wp-content/uploads/Basics-English10.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ATL-G7K6] (last visited June
12, 2022).
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In Thornburg, the appellees, Black citizens in North Carolina who were
registered to vote, argued that the apportionment scheme of the state legislature
targeted and separated majority-Black communities and therefore impaired the
Black citizens’ ability to vote for a representative of their choosing.48 In deciding
whether the prerequisite majority-minority district was apparent, the Thornburg
Court created a three-factor test, which requires the minority group to demonstrate:
“[1] that [the minority group] is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district[;] . . . [2] that [the minority group]
is politically cohesive[;] . . . [and] [3] that the . . . majority votes sufficiently as a
bloc to enable it . . . to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”49 Ultimately, the
Court found that a majority-minority block could be found in this case, as the
appellants met all three requirements of the test.50 Because the Thornburg Court
found a VRA violation in the redistricting process, it did not wade into the territory
of determining how the Court should scrutinize an Equal Protection racial
gerrymandering claim.
Through a series of cases, beginning with Shaw v. Reno,51 the Court has
established that the same Equal Protection analysis applies to cases involving a racial
gerrymander as cases involving government discrimination on the basis of race
generally. Reno was another case featuring redistricting in North Carolina; this time
following the 1990 redistricting cycle when North Carolina was awarded an
additional (twelfth) Congressional district.52 At the time, 20 percent of the eligible
voters in the state were Black while 78 percent were white, and in the redistricting
reapportionment, the state created a majority Black district.53 The appellants, the
North Carolina Republican Party and individual white voters, brought suit, claiming
the majority-Black district was a racial gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.54 In deciding the Equal Protection claim, the Court held that “the
Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislation that expressly distinguishes among
citizens because of their race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest.”55 In other words, in cases where race serves as a key factor,
a strict-scrutiny analysis applies.56 Further, the Court held that strict scrutiny also
applies to statutes that “although race neutral, are, on their face ‘unexplainable on
grounds other than race.’”57

48

Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 35.
Id. at 50–51.
50
Id. at 80.
51
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
52
Id. at 632.
53
Id. at 634.
54
Id. at 637.
55
Id. at 643 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 277–78 (1986)
(plurality opinion).
56
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
57
Reno, 509 U.S. at 643 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
49

2022]

THE COURT’S GERRYMANDERING CONUNDRUM

1143

The Reno opinion opened the door to the future questions of when courts will
consider race as a key factor in redistricting reapportionment decisions. The Court,
in Miller v. Johnson,58 gave guidance on this distinction; it concluded that a court
may find an unconstitutional racial gerrymander if race was the “predominant”
factor in the drawing of its lines.59 The Court noted that this “predominance” line of
reasoning can be further applied to racial gerrymandering cases in which the
legislative redistricting process appears facially neutral, so long as such cases show
a “discriminatory purpose” to the apportionment plan.60 In order to find this
discriminatory purpose, the Court pointed to Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, which held that “‘[d]iscriminatory purpose’ . . . implies
more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that
the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects.”61 Such a test
established a high threshold for a finding of an unconstitutional racial gerrymander
and helped set the foundation for the Court to distinguish racial gerrymandering
claims from claims that were purely partisan in nature.
This foundation was solidified by Cooper v. Harris,62 which is the Court’s most
recent opinion63 on racial gerrymandering claims. In Cooper, the Court concluded
that partisanship cannot be used to justify a racial gerrymandering claim.64 The
Court’s holding in Cooper made clear that a racial discrimination claim cannot be
found if a gerrymander unfairly hinders a certain political party, even though
empirical evidence shows that members of a particular race vote heavily in favor of
that party.65 Specifically, the Court will only find racial gerrymandering claims if
race was the predominant factor in line drawing and that the legislature distinguished
between races for the purpose of diluting one group’s voting power.66 As discussed
in the following Section, this separation of racial gerrymandering from partisan

58

515 U.S. 900 (1995).
See id. at 916 (“The plaintiff’s burden is to show, either through circumstantial
evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative
purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place
a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.” (emphasis added)).
60
Id. at 924–25.
61
Id. at 916 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
62
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
63
In a recent shadow docket decision, the Court granted injunctive relief to the state of
Alabama after citizens claimed an unlawful racial gerrymander. See Merrill v. Milligan, 142
S.Ct. 879 (2022). The oral argument for the case is set for Fall 2022.
64
Id. at 1488 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile some might find it distasteful, ‘[o]ur prior
decisions have made clear that a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political
gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats happen to be black
Democrats and even if the State were conscious of that fact.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551(1991))).
65
See id.
66
Id. 1463–64.
59
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gerrymandering has severe consequences with regard to the Court’s willingness to
consider gerrymandering claims.
B. Partisan Gerrymandering
As noted above, partisan gerrymandering has been around since the founding
of the country.67 The Court stood silent on these claims until the early 1970s but
since then has made four landmark decisions regarding the justiciability of partisan
gerrymandering claims. The final decision, made in Rucho v. Common Cause, found
partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable and barred federal courts from protecting
voters from plainly partisan gerrymanders.68
1. Pre-Rucho Partisan Gerrymandering Review
The first landmark decision regarding partisan gerrymandering came in 1973
in Gaffney v. Cummings.69 In Gaffney, the state of Connecticut incorporated political
data for assistance in drawing its maps with the intent to create districts under a
policy of political “fairness,” “which aimed at a rough scheme of proportional
representation of the two major political parties.”70 The purpose of the political data
usage was to create districts that reflected the statewide plurality of votes among
party lines and awarded a “proportionate number of Republican and Democratic
legislative seats” based on those lines.71 Additionally, the redistricting proposal
included a maximum deviation of population in house districts totaling 7.83 percent
and a maximum deviation of population in senate districts totaling 1.81 percent.72
Under this pretense, the Court found that while the population deviations could be
large enough to justify additional scrutiny, the fact that the state drew districts using
political data did not lead to an immediate conclusion that they were not “justifiable
and legally sustainable” under the Equal Protection Clause.73 Ultimately, the Court
concluded that “politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting
and apportionment,” and the fact that a state’s reapportionment plan attempted to
reflect the strength of major political parties in locating and defining election
districts did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.74
The second landmark case, Davis v. Bandemer,75 attempted to clarify the
Gaffney holding and left open the door for federal court intervention in partisan
gerrymandering claims. In this case, Indiana Democratic candidates for the State
House of Representatives in the 1982 election cycle received 51.9 percent of the
67

See supra Part I (describing the origin of the phrase in 1812).
See infra Part III.B.2.
69
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
70
Id. at 738.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 750.
73
Id. at 745.
74
Id. at 753.
75
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
68
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vote statewide, while the Republican candidates received 48.1 percent of the vote.76
Of the 100 seats to be filled, however, Republican candidates won 57 seats, and
Democratic candidates won only 43.77 The opinion had two key parts, which are
important for the partisan gerrymandering analysis.
The first part, a 6-3 opinion written by Justice White, held that political
gerrymandering “is properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.”78 Using
the rationale of Reynolds v. Sims,79 the Court felt it could reasonably adjudicate
gerrymandering cases where the issue of fair representation arises—and a case with
such blatant partisan gerrymandering is an issue of fair representation.80
In the second part, a plurality opinion, Justice White attempted to create an
Equal Protection test courts could apply to evaluate partisan gerrymandering
claims.81 This test required a showing of both discriminatory intent and
discriminatory purpose.82 For the discriminatory intent portion, Justice White felt
that such a showing was relatively easy to prove, reasoning that if the state conducted
the redistricting through a legislative process, then it is apparent “that the likely
political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.”83 As for whether
there is a discriminatory effect to such intent, Justice White reasoned that purpose
can be supported through “evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority
of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence
the political process.”84 Under this reasoning, evidence that a party lacks
proportional representation as it relates to a past election is not enough. Further,
there must be clear proof that the partisan vote dilution is of such an extreme nature
that the discriminated party lacks any fair chance to elect a candidate of its
choosing.85
While Davis held that partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable, the
Court still lacked a clear, decisive test for determining Equal Protection cases under
this gerrymandering under a partisan standard. In the twenty years following the
opinion, no lower court successfully created a manageable legal standard under

76

Id. at 115.
Id.
78
Id. at 143.
79
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
80
See id. at 118–20 (finding that “the constitutional deficiencies of plans that dilute the
vote of political groups, at the least supports an inference that these cases are justiciable”
under the Equal Protection Clause).
81
See id. at 129.
82
See id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 132.
85
See id. (“[A] group’s electoral power is not unconstitutionally diminished by the
simple fact of an apportionment scheme that makes winning elections more difficult, and a
failure of proportional representation alone does not constitute impermissible discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause”).
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which they could scrutinize partisan gerrymandering, thus paving the way for the
Court’s plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer.86
In Vieth, a plurality of Justices disagreed with the precedential effect of Davis.
The plurality held that partisan gerrymandering claims were nonjusticiable because
it was a political issue under which no manageable Equal Protection standards had
emerged, and thus, the political question doctrine, under the test set forth in Baker
v. Carr,87 was implicated.88 But because Vieth was a plurality opinion, the holding
from Davis, that partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable, remained good
law. In Vieth, Justice Kennedy, while concurring with the opinion’s ultimate
judgment, allowed for potential future claims to be brought under the First
Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause.89 Justice Kennedy opined that
the First Amendment and its protection of ideologies, beliefs, and political
associations could bring forth a valid unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering
claim in future cases.90
Interestingly, the Vieth dissent, written by Justice Souter, acknowledged that
the standards established in Davis were of such a high burden and contained
significant vagueness that no court would be able to succeed in establishing a
practical test.91 The dissent felt, however, that a lack of a test did not suggest that the
unconstitutionality of an apportionment plan could not be found; it simply meant
that the Court should establish an adequate test by which all courts can judge the
partisan gerrymandering issue.92 As a solution, the dissent proposed a new five-part
test in which the plaintiff alleging a partisan gerrymander under the Equal Protection
Clause would need to: (1) “identify a cohesive political group to which [s]he
belonged”;93 (2) show that the district of the plaintiff’s residence disregarded
“traditional districting principles” (e.g., “contiguity, compactness, respect for
political subdivisions, and conformity with geographic features . . .”);94 (3)
“establish specific correlations between the district’s deviations from traditional
86

Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting the six independent tests for the
existence of a political question, one of which is “a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving [the issue]”).
88
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267–69.
89
Id. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“That no such standard has emerged in this case
should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future.”).
90
Id. at 314 (“[T]hese allegations involve the First Amendment interest of not
burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process, their
voting history, their association with a political party, or their expression of political
views.”).
91
Id. at 345 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“This standard, which it is difficult to imagine a
major party meeting, combined a very demanding burden with significant vagueness; and if
appellants have not been able to propose a practical test for a Davis violation, the fault
belongs less to them than to our predecessors.”).
92
Id. at 343–47.
93
Id. at 347.
94
Id. at 347–48.
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districting principles and the distribution of the population of his group”;95 (4)
“present to the court a hypothetical district including her residence, one in which the
proportion of the plaintiff’s group was lower (in a packing claim) or higher (in a
cracking one) and which at the same time deviated less from traditional districting
principles than the actual district”;96 and (5) “show that the defendants acted
intentionally to manipulate the shape of the district in order to pack or crack his
group.”97
Following Vieth, the uncertainty surrounding partisan gerrymandering was
high. With no clear guidance pointing towards an agreed-upon test and disagreement
amongst the Justices of whether partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable,
the doctrine was on life support. The Court’s opinion in Rucho v. Common Cause
effectively pulled the plug.
2. Rucho v. Common Cause
In Rucho, the Court considered both a partisan gerrymander by Republicans in
North Carolina and a partisan gerrymander by Democrats in Maryland.98 In
Maryland, the Democrats never received more than 65 percent of the statewide
congressional vote; yet, from the 2012 elections through the 2018 elections,
Democrats won seven of the eight potential House seats, including one seat that was
previously a reliably Republican district before the 2010 census.99 In North Carolina,
Republican candidates won 10 out of the state’s 13 total congressional seats in 2016,
even though they only won 53 percent of the statewide vote.100 Further, in the 2018
election, the Republicans won nine out of a total of 12 seats even though statewide
they only won 50 percent of the total vote.101 Ultimately, the majority held partisan
gerrymandering claims were nonjusticiable and thus could not be heard by the
Court,102 while the dissent argued the claims were justiciable because there were
manageable standards to decide partisan gerrymandering claims.103

95

Id. at 349.
Id. at 349–50. The practice of “packing” occurs when a large number of minority
voters are placed in a small number of districts, while the practice of “cracking” occurs when
minority voters are spread thin over districts so they cannot form a majority to vote for a
preferred candidate. See Louis Michael Seidman, Rucho Is Right—But for the Wrong
Reasons, 23 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 865, 866 (2021).
97
Id. at 350.
98
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019) (5-4 decision).
99
See id. at 2511 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
100
See id. at 2510.
101
See id.
102
See id. at 2507 (majority opinion).
103
See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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(a) Majority Opinion
The Rucho Court, in a 5–4 opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts and decided
along ideological lines,104 held that gerrymandering claims that are partisan in nature
present political questions and are, therefore, nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine and beyond the reach of the Court.105 As a basis for its holding,
the Court cited precedent that an issue runs afoul of the political question doctrine
when it gives the Court no judicially manageable standard to decide the case.106 The
North Carolina district court had concluded that “the Elections Clause did not
empower State legislatures to disfavor the interests of supporters of a particular
candidate or party in drawing congressional districts.”107 However, the Court
disagreed with this analysis and found that the lower court’s argument was based
not on the Elections Clause but rather on the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, section
4, which gives the “guarantee to every State in [our] Union a Republican Form of
Government.”108 While acknowledging that the analysis rested in the Guaranty
Clause, the Court gave this argument little weight and cited precedent that has
repeatedly held that “the Guarant[y] Clause does not provide the basis for a
justiciable claim.”109 The Court, however, qualified this opinion by noting that state
courts can decide these claims so long as the respective state constitution provides a
method of review.110
Additionally, the Court dismissed the viability of a First Amendment claim, as
noted by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Vieth, concluding that the available First
104

Chief Justice Roberts was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh—each of whom was nominated by a Republican president; Justice Kagan
dissented, and was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor—each of whom was
nominated by a Democratic president. See id. at 2486; About the Court: Current Members,
SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.
cc/8FN7-5HLG] (last visited June 14, 2022); About the Court: Justices 1789 to Present, SUP.
CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc
/MND5-S552] (last visited June 14, 2022).
105
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508 (majority opinion) (“‘It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ In this rare circumstance, that means
our duty is to say ‘this is not law.’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)));
see also U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1 (restricting federal courts to deciding “Cases” and
“Controversies,” meaning that federal courts can address only questions historically viewed
as capable of resolution through the judicial process).
106
Id. at 2487 (“Among the political question cases [the] Court has identified are those
that lack ‘judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [them].’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962))).
107
Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 937 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
108
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2, cl. 1).
109
Id. (citing Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)
as an example of a past Supreme Court decision which disallowed a judiciable claim through
the Guaranty Clause).
110
See id. at 2507 (“Provisions in state statutes and state constitutions can provide
standards and guidance for state courts to apply.”).
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Amendment tests offer “no ‘clear’ and ‘manageable’ way of distinguishing
permissible from impermissible partisan motivation.”111 As a result, the Court held
that partisan gerrymandering claims were nonjusticiable under the Guaranty Clause,
the Equal Protection Clause, and the First Amendment. Consequently, the Court left
no avenue for a party to bring a claim for an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.
(b) Dissent
In her dissent, Justice Kagan112 expressed her fear that the majority’s opinion,
if left unchecked, threatened to harm the democratic system upon which our
country relies.113 The dissent argued that manageable standards were available to
the Court to decide partisan gerrymandering cases only in the worst-of-the-worst
case scenarios and that the Maryland and North Carolina gerrymanders clearly fell
under that “worst-of-the-worst” category.114 Such an egregious gerrymander, the
dissent said, in effect, amounts to the rigging of an election, and only judicial
intervention can cure such a corrupt process.115 Justice Kagan conceded that the
Court should not strike down a map when it shows just a “smidgen of politics.”116
She warned, however, that today’s gerrymandering, with increased block-level data
specificity, is different than partisan gerrymanders of the past, which has the ability
to “make gerrymanders far more effective and durable than before, insulating
politicians against all but the most titanic shifts in the political tides.”117
In contrast to the majority, Justice Kagan argued that an egregious partisan
gerrymandering claim is justiciable through the Equal Protection Clause.118 The
dissent found that the district court’s Rucho opinion adequately laid out a
sustainable test to determine an Equal Protection gerrymandering claim, which
proves: “(1) intent; (2) effects; and (3) causation.”119 Under this test, a party
challenging a districting plan must first prove that “state officials’ ‘predominant
purpose’ in drawing a district’s lines was to ‘entrench [their party] in power’ by

111

Id. at 2505.
Also joining the opinion were Justices Bader Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Breyer. See
id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
113
See id. (“If left unchecked, gerrymanders like the ones here may irreparably damage
our system of government.”).
114
See id.
115
See id. at 2512 (“By drawing districts to maximize the power of some voters and
minimize the power of others, a party in office at the right time can entrench itself there for
a decade or more, no matter what the voters would prefer.”).
116
See id. at 2515–16.
117
Id. at 2513; see also id. at 2512 (arguing that the “crude linedrawing [used by the
Framers] of the past” cannot be compared to the advanced techniques used today).
118
See id. at 2514 (“The Fourteenth Amendment, we long ago recognized, ‘guarantees
the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election’ of legislators.” (quoting
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 506, 566 (1964))).
119
Id. at 2516.
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diluting the votes of citizens favoring its rival.”120 Second, the party “must establish
that the lines drawn in fact have the intended effect by ‘substantially’ diluting their
votes.”121 Finally, if the party is able to make the first two showings of the test, then
“the State must come up with a legitimate, non-partisan justification to save its
map.”122
Ultimately, the dissent sympathized with the majority opinion’s concern for
maintaining political neutrality and understood there was the potential for a slippery
slope, with the Court stepping into the role of the state legislature and becoming too
involved in the redistricting process.123 Justice Kagan, however, contested this
concern and felt the dissent’s test, with its “predominant purpose” and “substantial
dilution” requirements, ensures a high discretionary threshold, where courts will
only be able to intervene in the most egregious partisan gerrymanders.124 Further,
the dissent took issue with the majority’s apparent conclusion that state courts could
“develop and apply neutral and manageable standards to identify unconstitutional
gerrymanders” but did not have the same confidence that federal courts would be
able to apply similar standards.125 In the dissent’s opinion, if state courts could apply
these standards, then the Court was more than capable of creating and applying
standards of their own.126 The dissent ended with a strong statement in which it found
that these partisan gerrymandering practices threatened the notion of our democratic
system of governing and that it was the job of the courts, in response to such threats,
to defend the foundations of this democracy and intervene when needed.127
Part III laid out the current federal jurisprudence surrounding gerrymandering,
culminating with the Rucho decision. Part IV will discuss the factors the Court failed
to consider in Rucho, and will argue that these factors necessitate a reconsideration
of Rucho’s holding.
IV. HYPER-PARTISANSHIP AND THE NECESSITY OF A RECONSIDERATION OF THE
RUCHO COURT’S NONJUSTICIABILITY CONCLUSION
The Court, through its opinion in Rucho, made it clear that partisan
gerrymandering claims will be considered nonjusticiable in federal courts; however,
there are certain trends the Court failed to give proper weight, which warrant a
120

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 864).
Id. (quoting Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 498 (2018)).
122
Id.
123
Id. at 2525.
124
Id. at 2522 (“[T]he combined inquiry used in these cases set the bar high, so that
courts could intervene in the worst partisan gerrymanders, but no others”).
125
Id. at 2524 (“If [state courts] can develop and apply neutral and manageable
standards to identify unconstitutional gerrymanders, why couldn’t we?”).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 2525 (“Of all times to abandon the Court’s duty to declare the law, this was
not the one. The practices challenged in these cases imperil our system of government. Part
of the Court’s role in that system is to defend its foundations. None is more important than
free and fair elections.”).
121
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reconsideration of the case. Given the strong correlation of race and party affiliation,
the concerning pattern of political parties targeting racial groups, and the hyperpartisan nature of today’s political climate, the Court should reconsider its
nonjusticiability precedent and intervene in partisan gerrymandering cases in order
to preserve our democracy. This Part examines: (A) the propensity of racial groups
to consistently vote for a particular party; (B) the rise of the “Great Replacement”
theory and its implications for gerrymandering; and (C) hyper-partisanship.
A. Changing Demographics and the Propensity for Racial Classes to Vote with a
Particular Party
Following the 2020 election, 34 percent of voters identified as Independent, 33
percent identified as Democrats, and 29 percent identified as Republicans.128 When
taking partisan leanings into account, 49 percent of all registered voters either
explicitly affiliate with the Democratic Party or lean towards the party, and 44
percent either explicitly affiliate with the Republican Party or lean towards the
GOP.129 In this context, it should be noted that “leaning” does not necessarily mean
that a registered voter will certainly vote for their identified or preferred political
party. For instance, in the 2016 presidential election, 5 percent of Republicanleaning voters voted for the Democratic candidate, while 4 percent of Democraticleaning voters voted for the Republican candidate.130 Thus, this data shows that the
switch of party-leaning voters tends to be relatively equal between parties, and the
deviation of voters who vote against their partisan leaning comes out as a relative
wash.131
When it comes to how racial categories vote, there are clear lines of party
favoritism amongst racial groups: 51 percent of registered white voters are more
likely to lean towards or affiliate with the Republican Party, compared with 43
percent of registered white voters who are more likely to lean towards or affiliate
with the Democratic Party.132 Additionally, 63 percent of Hispanic voters identify or
lean toward the Democratic Party, while 28 percent of Hispanic voters identify or

128

John Gramlich, What the 2020 Electorate Looks Like, by Party, Race and Ethnicity,
Age, Education and Religion, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org
/fact-tank/2020/10/26/what-the-2020-electorate-looks-like-by-party-race-and-ethnicity-ageeducation-and-religion/ [https://perma.cc/K4W2-53HQ] (citing a research survey and
analysis conducted on more than 12,000 voters in 2018 and 2019).
129
Id.
130
PEW RSCH. CTR., AN EXAMINATION OF THE 2016 ELECTORATE, BASED ON
VALIDATED VOTERS (2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/08/09/anexamination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters/ [https://perma.cc/M6HF9F4D].
131
See id.
132
See PEW RSCH. CTR., 1. TRENDS IN PARTY AFFILIATION AMONG DEMOGRAPHIC
GROUPS
(2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/03/20/1-trends-in-partyaffiliation-among-demographic-groups/ [https://perma.cc/89M7-RLVH].
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lean toward the Republican Party.133 The partisan disparity of Black voters is the
most drastic of all the racial classes: 84 percent of registered Black voters identify
or lean towards the Democratic party, while only 8 percent of Black voters identify
or lean towards the Republican party.134 To add further context to this data, 85
percent of all Republican voters in the 2020 presidential election were white, while
15 percent were voters of color (defined in the poll as Black, Latinx, or other nonwhite races).135 In contrast, roughly 60 percent of all Democratic voters in the 2020
election were white, while 40 percent were voters of color.136
These correlations in party affiliations between racial classes are important
when considering the changing demographics of the country. Currently, nonHispanic white voters make up 69 percent of the registered voting base, Black and
Hispanic voters make up 11 percent each, and Asian American voters make up 5
percent of total voters.137 These numbers are likely to see significant changes,
considering that the overall share of white Americans has consistently dropped as
the overall population becomes more diverse.138 Further, the population of people of
color—those who identify as “Latin[x] or Hispanic, Asian American, Black, Native
American, or two or more races (including whites)”—is consistently on the rise,
with children of color now comprising “more than half (53 percent) of the nation’s
total youth population, as well as in 21 states.”139
These statistics strongly suggest that, at the very least, there is some correlation
between race and political association which could blur the lines between partisan
and racial gerrymanders. The ever-growing diversity in the country should be a
positive sign for those who pride themselves on our country being a “melting pot”
of cultures and ethnicities. Nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments, however, bring
forth a troubling trend among certain political circles perpetuating a “Great
Replacement” rhetoric. The following Section discusses how this rhetoric has
further blurred the line between racial and partisan distinctions.
133

Id.
Id.
135
Yair Ghitza & Jonathan Robinson, What Happened in 2020, CATALIST,
https://catalist.us/wh-national/ [https://perma.cc/C8VZ-CXG2] (last visited June 12, 2022).
136
See id.
137
See Gramlich, supra note 128 (describing the voting share of white, Black, and
Hispanic voters); see also Abby Budiman, Asian Americans Are the Fastest Growing Racial
or Ethnic Group in the U.S. Electorate, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 7, 2020), https://www.pew
research.org/fact-tank/2020/05/07/asian-americans-are-the-fastest-growing-racial-or-ethnic
-group-in-the-u-s-electorate/ [https://perma.cc/DW32-3LU4].
138
See, e.g., Mike Schneider, Census Shows US Is Diversifying, White Population
Shrinking, AP NEWS (Aug. 12, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/census-2020-houseelections-4ee80e72846c151aa41a808b06d975ea
[https://perma.cc/GH3A-MZGG]
(describing how recent Census data shows the overall population share of white Americans
“fell from 63.7 percent in 2010 to 57.8 percent in 2020”).
139
William H. Frey, America’s Shrinking White Population Needs to Value Youthful
Diversity, BROOKINGS (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2021/09
/09/americas-shrinking-white-population-needs-to-value-youthful-diversity/ [https://perma.
cc/6AM6-K7R].
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B. The Rise of the ‘Great Replacement’ Theory
The “Great Replacement” theory—a concept “popular in white supremacist
circles that immigrants are being brought in to replace native-born (read: White)
Americans”—has been a consistent talking point circling around extremist white
nationalist communities.140 Recently, however, this language has made its way into
national politics, including in the redistricting processes. In particular, Republican
figureheads have embraced the replacement theory belief that the growing number
of voters of color in this country is part of a greater Democratic ploy to add new
voters to their ranks.141 Such statements explicitly denote the thinking of some
members of the Republican party—increased voter turnout from communities of
color directly correlates to increased votes for the Democratic Party.
An example of this line of thinking can be found in the recent comments of
Texas Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick. As part of his duties, Patrick is one of five
members on the Legislative Redistricting Board of Texas, which draws the district
lines of the state should its legislature fail to do so.142 Patrick, in an interview with
Fox News anchor Laura Ingraham stated that Democratic policy invites millions of
Latinx immigrants into the country, and “every one of them has two or three children
. . . . Who do you think they’re going to vote for?”143 Patrick’s rhetorical question
implies that he, a member of Texas’ Redistricting Board, directly correlates the rise
of Latinx immigrants with a rise in Democratic vote.
It is worth noting that the “Great Replacement”144 theory concept also
permeates into Democratic Party rhetoric, and party leaders are not insulated from
its line of reasoning. In an interview discussing Black voters during the lead-up to
the 2020 election, then-Democratic candidate Joe Biden stated, “[i]f you have a

140

Aaron Blake, How Republicans Learned to Stop Worrying and Embrace
‘Replacement Theory’ — by Name, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2021, 4:54 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/09/27/how-republicans-learned-stop-worry
ing-embrace-replacement-theory-by-name/ [https://perma.cc/WTG6-5MUJ].
141
See, e.g., @EliseStefanik, TWITTER (May 16, 2022, 5:55 AM), https://twitter.com/
EliseStefanik/status/1526169590841106432 [https://perma.cc/28AP-K9FY] (“Democrats
desperately want wide open borders and mass amnesty for illegals allowing them to vote.”).
Elise Stefanik is the Chair of the House Republican Conference. See About Congresswoman
Stefanik, ELISE STAFANIK, https://stefanik.house.gov/about-congresswoman-stefanik
[https://perma.cc/LMH6-JM76] (last visited June 22, 2022).
142
See TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 28.
143
James Barragán, Dan Patrick Warns Democrats Are Allowing in Immigrants for
“Silent Revolution,” Mirroring Language of Far-Right Extremists, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 17,
2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/09/17/texas-dan-patrick-immigrantsdemocrats-haitians/ [https://perma.cc/Z9DF-3HRB].
144
See generally Lauretta Charlton, What Is the Great Replacement (Aug. 6, 2019),
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/us/politics/grand-replacement-explainer
.html [https://perma.cc/DK8T-M78Z].
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problem figuring out whether you’re for me or Trump, then you ain’t Black.”145
Biden later apologized for the insensitive comment, but in the apology, he
acknowledged that he needed the Black vote in order to win the presidency.146
When both parties explicitly acknowledge the advantage or disadvantage they
receive in elections due to changes or propensities in certain demographics, it is fair
to question why the Court has failed to consider similar lines of reasoning and has
separated partisan from racial gerrymanders. Further, as changing demographics
persist, it is fair to assume that such rhetoric will not only continue but will also
strengthen. As discussed in the next Section, this strengthening has led to a
consequence of increased political divisiveness and, should the Court continue to
separate race from politics, such divisiveness can become a severe detriment to the
democratic electoral process.
C. A New Era of Hyper-partisanship
At the time Rucho was decided, the Court may have felt the political climate fit
into the general ebb and flow of hyper-partisanship seen throughout this country’s
history.147 The Court itself seemed to predicate its opinion on the idea that voters
shift their allegiance throughout their lifetime, and there are independent voters upon
which no party can rely:
Even the most sophisticated districting maps cannot reliably account for
some of the reasons voters prefer one candidate over another, or why their
preferences may change. Voters elect individual candidates in individual
districts, and their selections depend on the issues that matter to them, the
quality of the candidates, the tone of the candidates’ campaigns, the
performance of an incumbent, national events or local issues that drive
voter turnout, and other considerations. Many voters split their tickets.
Others never register with a political party, and vote for candidates from
both major parties at different points during their lifetimes.148
This sentiment, however, failed to consider the current gravity of today’s
political climate, in which the ideological overlap in political party affiliations is
low, and more Americans are voting on strict party lines. Republicans today vote
145

Breakfast Club Power 105.1 FM, Joe Biden on Woman Running Mate, Democrats
Taking Black Voters for Granted + Wiping Weed Crime, YOUTUBE, 17:21–17:27 (May 22,
2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KOIFs_SryHI [https://perma.cc/C8CN-WK9A].
146
Quint Forgey & Myah Ward, Biden Apologizes for Controversial ‘You Ain’t Black’
Comment, POLITICO (May 22, 2020, 6:54 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/22/
joe-biden-breakfast-club-interview-274490 [https://perma.cc/T934-5N8J].
147
See Michael S. Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1379, 1380–
87 (2020) (noting that much of the law of redistricting has “grown up during an era of unusual
bipartisanship” while the “skepticism about the political science reached its obvious apex in
Rucho v. Common Cause”).
148
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2503 (2019).
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consistently for Republicans, and Democrats vote consistently for Democrats.149
Additionally, in our current state, following the 2020 election and the campaigns of
misinformation that culminated with the January 6 insurrection,150 heightened
partisanship serves as a direct and poignant threat to the safety of our democracy.151
Evidence of such hyper-partisanship can be found in the statements of current
legislators and party officials that perpetuate the “Stop the Steal” movement and
threaten future violence as an eventual consequence of alleged election fraud.152
Additionally, following the 2020 election, an election which has been validated as
legitimate,153 only 26 percent of Republicans felt Donald Trump’s loss to President
Biden was “legitimate and accurate,” while 68 percent of Republicans felt the

149
See Kang, supra note 147, at 1418–19 (showing that the disparity in split-ticket
voting versus straight ticket voting in the past century has widened significantly since the
1990s).
150
See Craig Silverman, Craig Timberg, Jeff Kao & Jeremy Merrill, Facebook Hosted
Surge of Misinformation and Insurrection Threats in Months Leading Up to Jan. Attack,
Records Show, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 4, 2022, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/
facebook-hosted-surge-of-misinformation-and-insurrection-threats-in-months-leading-upto-jan-6-attack-records-show [https://perma.cc/HFC5-LQE] (describing how false news
stories ran rampant in the days leading up to the January 6 protest, which culminated in
Trump-supporting protestors storming the Capitol and demanding that Senators not count
electoral votes).
151
See Zogby, The Zogby Poll: Will the US Have Another Civil War?, ZOGBY
ANALYTICS (Feb. 4, 2021), https://zogbyanalytics.com/news/997-the-zogby-poll-will-theus-have-another-civil- [https://perma.cc/QK3N-WEEL] (illustrating that a plurality—46
percent—of Americans believed after the 2020 election that a future civil war amongst
parties was likely).
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See @polialertcom, TWITTER (Aug. 30, 2021 5:03 PM), https://twitter.com/polialert
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election was “rigged.”154 Further, over one-third of all Americans feel that the 2020
election was stolen away from Donald Trump.155
The Rucho majority felt confident that state courts were an adequate, objective
solution to resolve partisan gerrymandering disputes.156 State legislatures, however,
are now looking to take away any state supreme court judicial review when it comes
to redistricting. In the Court’s upcoming case, Moore v. Harper,157 the state of North
Carolina is looking to use a brand new “independent state legislature” theory to
petition the Court to deny a state supreme court reversal on a Republican Party
gerrymander.158 This theory promotes the idea that a state legislature has nearly
unbridled authority to set procedures in federal elections, and state courts cannot
supplant nor review this authority.159 Such an action serves as an example of how
hyper-politically charged legislatures are already looking to supplant what they view
as a weak authority to review their redistricting responsibility.
Further, the current makeup of state courts suggests that leaving these decisions
out of the reach of federal review only adds to partisan divide and creates more
distrust in the democratic process as it currently stands. Currently, eight states
(representing over one-fourth of the nation’s total population) have partisan
elections to nominate state supreme court justices.160 The partisan election process
in determining state judges has historically been criticized.161 Due to their political
affiliations, these judges’ decisions may skew in favor of the policy goals of their
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preferred party.162 Thus, elected judges reviewing a state’s redistricting map can
have an underlying incentive to decide a case that favors their affiliated political
party. Additionally, voters may associate a court’s decision about electoral maps
with their perception of those judges’ political affiliations, thus further fueling the
public’s view that the election process is rigged. This type of review has obvious
political consequences and makes some state courts—counter to the Rucho
majority’s opinion—perhaps the worst suited to deal with this type of review.
The federal courts have the standards and distanced objectivity to better handle
these types of partisan gerrymander reviews. The Court, however, has ignored this
practicality of federal review, and instead suggested that the process should come
from Congressional or state legislative action.163 Such a decision is effectively
asking voters whose political power has been sapped by partisan gerrymandering to
then use their now-limited political power to put a stop to partisan
gerrymandering.164 The reasoning is circular and does not consider the harm caused
when an individual is not equally represented in the democratic process. Further, the
hyper-partisan nature of politics the Court failed to consider in Rucho heavily
suggests that these redistricting decisions should have some federal review. The
Court must step-in when blatantly political practices dilute the voice of a political
party, no matter which political party may benefit from such gerrymandering.
Of course, as this Note has described above, the Court can still decide cases on
ideological lines and is not completely without bias in this regard. But of the three
branches that could decide this issue, the federal judiciary has the standards and
distanced objectivity to better handle these types of partisan gerrymander reviews.
As Justice Kagan noted in her Rucho dissent, “[i]f [state courts] can develop and
apply neutral and manageable standards to identify unconstitutional gerrymanders,
why [can’t] we?”165
Part V will discuss a viable standard that the Court could apply to fill this
judicial gap.
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V. A NEW TEST FOR PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS
For the Court to adequately reconsider the justiciability of partisan
gerrymandering claims, it is paramount that the Court adopt a standard for which it
can scrutinize such claims.166 In adopting a standard, the Court should use as its
benchmark the dissent’s proposal in Rucho.167
Under this test, a party would only be able to prevail on an Equal Protection
partisan gerrymandering claim if they can prove a redistricting reapportionment had
(1) the intent; (2) the effect; and (3) the causation to effectively target a certain
political party and dilute their voting power by way of drawing district lines in a
particular manner.168 I further suggest, however, that the Court incorporate computer
models focused on the traditional redistricting principles into the test to lessen
human bias and create a more objective analysis.
The Court should use statistical analysis to determine the test’s first two parts—
intent and effect. Professor Samuel Wang recently offered three modeling tests that
should be adopted.169 The first two tests use statistical models to indicate whether
there was intent to gerrymander and favor a particular party.170 The third test uses
rapid computer simulation models to analyze whether the intent actually affected
gerrymandering.171
The first test, which is used to determine intent, is the “lopsided outcomes”
test.172 This test compares “the difference between the share of Democratic votes in
the districts that Democrats win and the share of Republican votes in the districts
that Republicans win.”173 Under this test, a gerrymander is considered well-executed
if it “has a maximum number of districts that each contain just enough governingparty supporters to let the party’s candidates win and hold the seat safely . . . [a]nd
it packs the opposition’s support into a minimum number of districts that the
opposition will win overwhelmingly.”174 Intent is shown through this test through
electoral partisan outcomes which skew so heavily in favor of one political party,
that such a result could not have realistically arisen by chance, and thus heavily
implies deliberate actions by those who drew the lines.175
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The second test, also used to determine intent, is referred to as the “reliable
wins” test.176 There are two different versions of this test which are dependent on
whether a state’s political representation is closely divided or whether it is a state
where the redistricting party is dominant.177 Under the closely divided intent
application, the test measures the difference between the mean and median vote
shares of a party.178 Under the dominant party application, the test compares the
standard deviations of the dominant party’s vote share in the district it wins statewide
with the vote share of the districts won nationwide.179
Once intent has been confirmed through the first two steps, the third and final
test, referred to as the “excess seats” test,180 is used to indicate whether there was a
discriminatory effect in a partisan gerrymandering process. The excess means test
uses rapid computer simulations to gauge “whether the outcome of an election after
redistricting was dysproportional relative to a simulated seats/votes curve and
whether that outcome favors the redistricting party.”181
Once discriminatory intent and effect have been found using Wang’s three tests,
the Court can go to the third step of this proposed standard and determine whether
the reapportionment caused a partisan gerrymander. This test will be a traditional
scrutiny analysis in which “the State must come up with a legitimate, non-partisan
justification to save its map.”182
This standard, a mixture of historical Court jurisprudence with precise
statistical analysis, would work to mitigate the harm caused by the largest deficiency
in the gerrymandering process—human discretion. At a time when distrust in the
democratic process is at a historic high, a non-biased judicial approach to
gerrymandering questions may just be the solution to restoring faith in our
democracy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court has found itself at a distinct time in history, where Americans are
skeptical about the integrity of our democratic structure, and distrust for its
safeguards are at an all-time high. With its decision in Rucho to deny federal judicial
review to even the most egregious of partisan gerrymanders, the Court failed to calm
this sentiment, and instead added fuel to the hyper-partisan fire. But with a
reconsideration of this decision and implementation of the objective test suggested
in this Note, the Court would have the opportunity to become a countering force to
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this distrust and bring some credibility back to the electoral process. The Court has
the choice to accept its responsibility to safeguard Americans from partisan
corruption of the electoral process, or it can continue its current course and watch
from the sidelines as the legitimacy of our democratic processes erodes.

